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U.C.C. ARTICLE 9-DISPOSITION OF REPOSSESSED COLLATERAL
NOTICE AND DEFICIENCY-A NEW RULE IN ARKANSAS, Rhodes v.
Oaklawn Bank, 279 Ark. 51, 648 S.W.2d 470 (1983).
In early 1978 the defendant, Jerry Rhodes, executed a promis-
sory note for $20,592.02 to the plaintiff, Oaklawn Bank.' The note
was secured by restaurant equipment and a portable building.2 Late
in 1978 Rhodes defaulted and Oaklawn repossessed the collateral.3
In July of 1979, Oaklawn sold the various items for $1,400 without
giving Rhodes specific notice of the sale.4 ak l awn then sued for a
deficiency of $21,516.32 plus costs, interest and attorney's fees.5
Rhodes defended on the ground that Oaklawn's failure to notify
made the sale commercially unreasonable.6 The circuit court
granted a deficiency judgment of $21,516.32 without making specific
findings of fact or conclusions of law.7 The Arkansas Court of Ap-
peals affirmed.8 On review, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that
Oaklawn's failure to notify Rhodes of the sale as required by section
9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code9 precluded Oaklawn from
recovering a deficiency judgment. I0 Rhodes v. Oaklawn Bank, 279
Ark. 51, 648 S.W.2d 470 (1983).
Prior to enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in Arkan-
sas," a secured party had two principal alternative remedies after
default by the debtor: (1) recovery of the collateral or (2) action on
the debt. 12 As early as 1887, Arkansas courts allowed a secured
party to recover collateral securing a debt by an action of replevin at
common law.' 3 The action is now codified' 4 and generally entitles a
1. Rhodes v. Oaklawn Bank, 279 Ark. 51, 53, 648 S.W.2d 470 (1983).
2. Id.
3. Rhodes, 279 Ark, at 53, 648 S.W.2d at 471.
4. Id
5. Id
6. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-504(3) (1961 & Supp. 1983).
7. Rhodes, 279 Ark. at 53, 648 S.W.2d at 470.
8. Rhodes v. Oaklawn Bank, No. 82-412 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd 279 Ark. 51, 648
S.W.2d 470 (1983).
9. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-504(3) (1961 & Supp. 1983).
10. Rhodes, 279 Ark. at 53, 648 S.W.2d at 472.
11. Arkansas enacted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in 1961, effective Decem-
ber 31. The Uniform Commercial Code, 1961 Ark. Acts 185 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 85-1-101 to 9-507) (1961 & Supp. 1983).
12. Anderson & Hale, Conditional Sales in Arkansas, 4 ARK. L. REV. 19, 27 (1949).
13. Kirby v. Tompkins, 48 Ark. 273, 3 S.W. 363 (1887).
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secured party to a judgment for the return of the property, 15 or in
the alternative, payment of the value of the property. 16 The secured
party could also peaceably reposses the collateral 17 without judicial
process, where the contract so provided. 8
Alternatively, the creditor could allow the defaulting debtor to
retain possession of the collateral and sue in contract for the unpaid
balance of the debt.' 9 Upon obtaining judgment, the secured party
obtained a writ of execution 20 authorizing the sheriff to sell the
property of the debtor at public auction. 2' The proceeds of the sale
were used to satisfy the debt.22 One of the major advantages of this
procedure was that after obtaining judgment, the secured party
could attach the collateral and any other property held by the
debtor to satisfy that judgment.23 However, under the doctrine of
election of remedies, 24 recovery of the collateral, either by replevin
or peaceable repossession, precluded the secured party from institut-
ing an action to recover on the debt.25 The secured party's reposses-
sion was said to be inconsistent with his action to recover on the
debt.26
Adoption of the U.C.C. in Arkansas eliminated the election of
remedies problem.27 However, a closer examination of the U.C.C.
provisions reveals some new pitfalls for the conditional seller seek-
ing to take advantage of this new found right to dispose of repos-
sessed collateral and recover on the remaining contract debt.
14. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2101 to -2126 (1962 Repl. & Supp. 1983).
15. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2116 (1962 Repl. & Supp. 1983). See also Anderson & Hale,
supra note 12, at 36 (debtor in possession of property must surrender it, if debtor is not in
possession then the secured party is entitled to execution on his money judgment).
16. See Anderson & Hale, supra note 12, at 37, 38 (for a discussion of the amount a
debtor must pay in lieu of surrendering the collateral).
17. Id at 30-34 (the secured party's property interest will support the retaking).
18. American Can Co. v. White, 130 Ark. 381, 197 S.W. 695 (1917).
19. Id See also Anderson & Hale, supra note 12, at 39 (discussion of action for the
price).
20. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-101 (1979 Repl. & Supp. 1983). For property subject to exe-
cution see ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-201 to -220 (1979 Repl. & Supp. 1983).
21. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-106 (1979 Repl. & Supp. 1983). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-411,
419 (1979 Repl.).
22. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-411 (1979 Repl.).
23. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-4 (2d. ed. 1980).
24. McRae v. Merrifield, 48 Ark. 160, 2 S.W. 780 (1887).
25. Id
26. McCain v. Fender, 188 Ark. 1139, 69 S.W.2d 867 (1934).
27. Mooney, The Old and the New. Article IX, 16 ARK. L. REV. 145 (1961). The author
states, "The most significant change ... is the final and conclusive eradication of the doc-
trine of election of remedies .. " Id at 15 1.
REPOSSESSED COLLATERAL
Under the U.C.C., unless otherewise agreed, a secured party
may peaceably repossess collateral held by a debtor in default with-
out judicial process.28 Furthermore, there is no requirement that the
debtor be notified prior to repossession by the secured party.29 In
addition to peaceable repossession, the statutory action of replevin
remains available to the secured party.3 °
Upon either method of repossession, the secured party has two
options with respect to disposition of the collateral. The first is strict
foreclosure; the retention of the collateral in full satisfaction of the
debt.3' Except in the case of consumer goods, where the debtor has
paid sixty percent of either the cash price or the loan amount, a
secured party may propose to retain the collateral in full satisfaction
of the debt by simply notifying th debtor and any other secured
party from whom the secured party has received written notice of a
claim of an interest in the collateral of his intention to do so. 32 The
second option available to a secured party in possession of the col-
lateral is disposition by sale.33 However, a secured party must com-
ply with two requirements in conducting this sale: (1) the debtor
must be given reasonable notice of the disposition, and (2) the sale
must be "commercially reasonable. ' 34
The reasonable notification requirement was designed to allow
the debtor and other interested parties adequate opportunity to re-
deem the collateral, 35 or to procure financing to purchase at the
sale.36 The notice must contain, at a minimum, the time and place
28. Teeter Motor Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Hot Springs, 260 Ark. 764, 543 S.W.2d 938
(1976). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-503 (1961 & Supp. 1983). See also J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 23, at § 26-6 for a general discussion of what may constitute breach of
peace.
29. Teeter Motor Co., 260 Ark. at 766, 543 S.W.2d at 940.
30. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-501(1) (1961 & Supp. 1983) which provides that the
secured party "may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security
interest by any available judicial procedure."
31. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-505 (1961 & Supp. 1983).
32. Id. But cf. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) § 9-505 (1981) (debtor may surren-
der the collateral and upon acceptance by the secured party claim satisfaction of the
indebtedness).
33. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-504(1) (1961 & Supp. 1983). A secured party has the right
"to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral .. " Id ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 85-9-505 (1961 & Supp. 1983) (Disposition by sale is compulsory in the case of consumer
goods, debtor having paid sixty percent of loan amount or cash price).
34. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-504(3) (1961 & Supp. 1983).
35. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-506 (1961 & Supp. 1983) which provides for redemp-
tion by the debtor at any time prior to disposition by the secured party.
36. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-504, Comment 5 (1961 & Supp. 1983).
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of the disposition" and is effective when sent. 38 Notice of reposses-
sion by the secured party is not sufficient as notice of an intent to
dispose of the collateral at sale.3 1 In addition, oral notice of pro-
spective disposition by the secured party has been held insufficient.4 °
On the other hand, the notice requirement may be waived by the
debtor after default4 I and is subject to two exceptions: notice need
not be given with respect to collateral that is perishable or likely "to
decline speedily in value. .,,"42 and collateral "of a type customa-
rily sold on a recognized market. 43
The requirements that the debtor be notified and that the sale
be commercially reasonable are viewed by some authors as serving
to protect the debtor from creditor abuse, while simultaneously af-
fording the creditor the benefit of the liberal disposition provisions
of section 9-504. 4  Since the U.C.C. permits private sales45 and spe-
cifically provides for a deficiency judgment on the contract debt in
the event the sale proceeds are not sufficient,46 the secured party is
held to the "commercially reasonable" disposition sale standard in
order that deficiencies be minimized. This includes method, man-
ner, time, place and terms of sale.47 The price obtained at a disposi-
tion sale alone is not determinative of commercial reasonableness, 48
but price may be a significant factor.49 Notice may also figure into
the commercial reasonableness determination, rendering the sale
37. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-504(3) (1961 & Supp. 1983).
38. Hudspeth Motors Inc. v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W.2d 191 (1964) (overruled
257 Ark. 263, 516 S.W.2d 379 (1974) (notice by certified mail not received by the debtor
upheld as reasonable). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-1-201(26) (1961 & Supp. 1983) where
notice is defined as "taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in
ordinary course whether or not such other actually comes to know of it."
39. Wheeless v. Eudora Bank, 256 Ark. 644, 509 S.W.2d 432 (1974).
40. Barker v. Horn, 245 Ark. 315, 432 S.W.2d 21 (1968) (verbal notice by secured party
stating the repossessed collateral would be sold to the highest bidder held insufficient).
41. Teeter Motor Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Hot Springs, 260 Ark. at 767, 543 S.W.2d at
940 (1976) ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-504(3) (Supp. 1983).
42. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-504(3) (1961 & Supp. 1983).
43. Id See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 23, at § 26-10 (discussion of types
of goods customarily sold on a recognized market).
44. See generally R. HENSON, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial
Code § 10-10 (2d. ed. 1979). See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 23, at § 26-9.
45. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-504, Comment 1 (Supp. 1983) which says, "it is hoped
that private sale will be encouraged where, .. [it] will result in higher realization on collat-
eral for the benefit of all parties."
46. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-504(2) (1961 & Supp. 1983).
47. Id at § 85-9-504(3).
48. Goodin v. Farmers Tractor & Equipment Co., 249 Ark. 30, 458 S.W.2d 419 (1970).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-507(2) (1961 & Supp. 1983).
49. Farmers Equipment Co. v. Miller, 252 Ark. 1092, 482 S.W.2d 805 (1972).
REPOSSESSED COLLATERAL
unreasonable due to misleading notice.5 0 Although the U.C.C. is
silent on public sale requirements," adequate notice, an accurate
description of the collateral to be sold, date, place, and terms of the
sale are likely to be required in order to comply with the "commer-
cially reasonable" standard. 2
Section 9-507 of the Code imposes liability on a secured party
for failure to comply with the aforementioned requirements of no-
tice and commercial reasonableness. The debtor, or any person en-
titled to notice of proposed disposition, has a right to recover from
the secured party any loss suffered due to the secured party's failure
to comply with the statutory requirements of disposition. If disposi-
tion of the collateral is not proceeding in compliance with the statu-
tory requirements the debtor may seek an order restraining sale or
providing specific terms and conditions governing sale. 3 According
to Harrell Motors, Inc. v. Sweeten, if disposition has occurred, a
debtor may recover his loss by showing a surplus would have been
generated at a sale conducted in compliance with the U.C.C.54 In
addition, where disposition has occurred, debtors have used a se-
cured party's failure to notify and the 9-507 damages provision to
prevent recovery of any deficiency by the secured party.
The first case decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court dealing
with a secured party's failure to meet statutory disposition require-
ments was Baber v. Williams Ford Co., decided in 1965.11 In Baber
the supreme court, dealing with a question of sufficiency of a notice
of resale, indicated that in order for a secured party "to hold the
debtor. . . liable for any deficiency,. . . [he] must give the debtor
'reasonable notice'. . . ." The rationale used in Baber did not em-
ploy the 9-507(1) damages provision, but simply conditioned the
debtor's liability for a deficiency on proper notice by the secured
party. The same court, in Norton v. National Bank of Commerce ,56
in addressing a case of insufficient notice stated the following rule:
Upon the issue of Norton's damages simple considerations of fair
play cast a burden of proof upon the bank. It was the bank
which wrongfully disposed of the car without notice to the debt-
50. Id
51. See R. HENSON, supra note 44, at § 10-10.
52. Wilkerson Motor Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 580 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1978). See also 49
OKLA. BAR ASS'N J. 115; Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 575 (discussion of public sale requirements).
53. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-507 (1961 & Supp. 1983).
54. 4 Ark. App. 230, 628 S.W.2d 878 (1982).
55. 239 Ark. 1054, 396 S.W.2d 302 (1965).
56. 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
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ors. . . . It would be manifestly unfair for the creditor to derive
an advantage from its own misconduct. We think the just solu-
tion is to indulge the presumption in the first instance that the
collateral was worth at least the amount of the debt, thereby
shifting to the creditor the burden of proving the amount that
should reasonably have been obtained through a sale conducted
according to law."
Thus, unlike Harrell Motors, Inc. v. Sweeten,58 the debtor, when
faced with a deficiency, did not have to show that a commercially
reasonable sale would have produced a surplus. In Norton the cred-
itor, after being found to have conducted a commercially unreason-
able sale, had to show that there would have been a deficiency even
if the sale had been commercially reasonable. Upon such a show-
ing, however, a secured party may still recover a deficiency after
failing to conduct disposition in accordance with statute. This rule
was followed in Universal CT Credit Corp. v. Rone,59 where the
supreme court reversed and remanded a judgment due to an instruc-
tion that "failed to allow for the fact that, when commercial code
requirements for disposition of collateral have not been followed,
judgment for a secured party can be rendered for the amount by
which its deficiency exceeds the amount the collateral reasonably
should have brought if code requirements had been followed."6
The most recent case upholding the Norton approach, Harper v.
Wheatley Implement Co., Inc. ,6 put it in somewhat different terms.
"The real issue on this point is whether the [debtors] were given
proper credit for the proceeds of the sale . . . had the private sale
been conducted according to law."62 The results of these cases
clearly indicated that a secured party could recover a deficiency
even though disposition of repossessed collateral did not meet the
requirements of notice and/or commercial reasonableness. The
court would simply require the creditor to show additional proof as
to the reasonable value of the collateral.63 However, in Rhodes v.
Oaklawn Bank,64 failure to meet the notice requirement operated to
bar a deficiency judgment altogether.
57. Id at 149-50, 398 S.W.2d at 542.
58. 4 Ark. App. 230, 628 S.W.2d 878 (1982).
59. 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970).
60. Id at 672, 453 S.W.2d at 41.
61. 278 Ark. 27, 643 S.W.2d 537 (1982).
62. Id at 34, 643 S.W.2d at 539-40 (citing Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Rone, 248
Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970)).
63. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 23, at § 26-15.
64. 279 Ark. 51, 648 S.W.2d 470 (1983).
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When a creditor repossesses chattles and sells them without
sending the debtor notice as to the time and date of sale, or as to
a date after which the collateral will be sold, he is not entitled to
a deficiency judgment, unless the debtor has specifically waived
his rights to such notice.65
In arriving at this conclusion, the supreme court purported to follow
precedent, citing Harper and Rone.66 However, an examination of
these cases indicates language directly contrary to that used in the
preceding quotation from Rhodes .67 For instance, the following lan-
guage appears in Rone: "The failure to give the notice required by
the code cannot constitute an absolute defense to an action for a
deficiency judgment. 68 In Harper,69 the supreme court reversed
and remanded a lower court judgment against a secured party who
had failed to notify the debtor in accordance with Section 9-504.70
The court held the lower court "erred in prohibiting the [secured
party] from producing evidence as to the commercial reasonableness
of the sale. . . ."' Although Harper was not perceived by the
Rhodes72 court to have dealt with the notice issue, it would seem
fruitless to reverse and remand a case in favor of a party against
whom an absolute defense could be asserted-the result if Rhodes,
decided just four months after Harper, is applied to the Harper
facts.
As a result of the holding Rhodes, a secured party who repos-
sesses collateral after default by the debtor must either notify the
debtor of a proposed disposition or obtain a written waiver of notice
from the debtor in order to retain his right to a deficiency judgment.
The practical significance of the new absolute defense against a defi-
ciency judgment is indicated by studies showing that disposition
sales may produce an average yield of only fifty percent of the out-
standing debt.73 Hence, in many cases, the deficiency judgment will
amount to a major portion of the secured party's recovery. Con-
versely, the availability of deficiency judgments may discourage at-
tempts by the secured party to obtain maximum value for the
65. Id at 55, 648 S.W.2d at 471.
66. Id at 54, 648 S.W.2d at 470.
67. Id at 55, 648 S.W.2d at 471.
68. 248 Ark. at 669, 453 S.W.2d at 39. (The supreme court cited Norton v. Nat'l Bank
of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966), in support of the quoted statement.)
69. 278 Ark. 27, 643 S.W.2d 537 (1982) (Justice Purtle writing for the court).
70. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-504(3) (1961 & Supp. 1983).
71. Harper, 278 Ark. at 36, 643 S.W.2d at 541.
72. 279 Ark. at 55, 648 S.W.2d at 471.
73. See, J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 23, at § 26-9.
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collateral on sale.14 Further, if a secured party may not recover any
deficiency, for whatever the reason, the loss occuring on disposition
may result in increased costs of lending to high risk debtors, causing
a corresponding decreased availability of credit to those in this
group.
Tom R. Barber
74. Id
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